University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 12: Evidence, Persuasion & Diversity

Jun 4th, 3:00 PM - 4:00 PM

Assessing Evidence Relevance by Disallowing Assessment
John Licato
University of South Florida

Michael Cooper
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Other Legal Studies Commons, Philosophy
Commons, and the Theory and Algorithms Commons

Licato, John and Cooper, Michael, "Assessing Evidence Relevance by Disallowing Assessment" (2020).
OSSA Conference Archive. 29.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA12/Thursday/29

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Assessing Evidence Relevance by Disallowing Assessment
JOHN LICATO
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Advancing Machine and Human Reasoning (AMHR) Lab
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL
United States of America
licato@usf.edu

MICHAEL COOPER
Department of Philosophy
Advancing Machine and Human Reasoning (AMHR) Lab
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL
United States of America
michaelcoop@usf.edu
Abstract: Guidelines for assessing whether potential evidence is relevant to some arguments tend to rely on criteria
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1. Introduction
In evidential reasoning, establishing that a piece of evidence is relevant to proving some fact may
require the elaboration of an evidential hypothesis, typically a general premise showing how a
candidate piece of evidence supports, or is relevant to proving, a target inference (Ball, 1980;
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 2011). The elaboration of an evidential hypothesis may be unnecessary in
cases where the relevance of a proposed fact is obvious, but in many scenarios, establishing
relevance might require additional inferential steps. Furthermore, even in cases where the
relevance of a fact appears obvious at first glance, the practice of making an evidential hypothesis
explicit may help a reasoner to catch and minimize the influence of cognitive, argumentative, or
stereotyping biases.
For example, consider the use of witness testimony in determining whether someone is
responsible for a crime. We may have previous knowledge that in a previous case, witness
testimony sf was allowed and determined to be relevant, but the determination of why sf was
considered relevant was not fully made explicit. If we nevertheless have a suspicion that the
reasoning used to determine the relevance of sf might apply to the witness testimony in the present
case, a decision procedure to test this suspicion by simultaneously generating and evaluating an
evidential hypothesis is highly desirable.
In this paper, we will present such a decision procedure. More precisely, assume we are
given:
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•
•
•
•

a factum probans / facta probantia sf (evidence given in support of sh whose relevance is in
question);
a factum probandum sh (fact to be proved);
a factum probans / facta probantia tf from a previous case C; and
a factum probandum th also from C, such that (1) tf was previously established to be
relevant to th, but a minimal or no evidential hypothesis was made explicit, and (2) the pair
(sf, sh) are similar to (tf, th).

Such scenarios will be familiar to proponents of case-based or analogical reasoning. The task we
then propose to solve with WG-A is one of analogical generalization: How might one
systematically and algorithmically use sf, sh, tf, th, and C to generate an evidential hypothesis which
simultaneously establishes (1) how sf is relevant to proving sh, and (2) how tf is relevant to proving
th?
The framework we will apply to this task is called WG-A (for Warrant Game -- Analogy),
which is based on the Articulation Model (AM) of analogical reasoning (Bartha. 2010). WG-A
allows for two participants, an advocate and a critic, to participate in a highly structured dialogical
exchange in which a warrant (in this case, an evidential hypothesis) is made explicit and the
relevance of facts to that warrant are tested iteratively. In other words, the relevance of facts is
tested continually as the participants take their turns, thus offering a solution to the concern that
any fact can be shown relevant to any other by simply creating an appropriately manufactured
evidential hypothesis, e.g., “if (fact 1) then (fact 2)” (Michael & Adler, 1931; Tillers, 2005).
Our goals for WG-A are twofold: First, we seek to create a well-defined model of good
analogical reasoning that can be used by, and used to teach, human reasoners. Second, WG-A is
part of a larger research project whose goals are to create highly structured modes of argumentative
interactions which lend themselves to computational implementation (they can be implemented as
computer programs) and automation (artificially intelligent reasoners can be developed which are
able to participate in these interactions). By studying the kinds of reasoning tasks that can be
carried out by WG-A, such as the target task of this paper, we hope to develop algorithms for
automated reasoners and datasets to train them. Our present work thus seeks to complement
existing related work (e.g., Bex et al., 2003; Bex, 2015; Verheij et al., 2016) by focusing on a
model of analogical generalization which can lead to the automated generation of evidential
hypotheses used to establish relevance.
We will proceed by introducing Bartha’s Articulation Model, upon which WG-A is based.
We will then explain WG-A itself, and provide summarized arguments for how WG-A establishes
relevance. Finally, we will close with a detailed example of WG-A solving a problem from the
target task introduced above.
2. Background
To provide the necessary context, Sections 2 and 3 will closely follow (Licato and Cooper, 2019).
2.1 Arguments by analogy
We take as our starting point Bartha’s (Bartha, 2010) general schema for analogical arguments.
An analogical mapping is a systematic, one-to-one correspondence between two groups of
propositions: a source domain, and a target domain. On the basis of this mapping, an analogical
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argument concludes that some hypothetical proposition holds in the target domain. Borrowing
terms from Keynes (Keynes, 1921), an analogical argument can be seen as consisting of four parts:
•

Positive analogy (P) – Proposition groups P in the source domain and P* in the target
domain that correspond to “known similarities”.
• Negative analogy (N) - Proposition groups A,¬B in the source domain and ¬A*,B* in the
target domain corresponding to “known differences” between the domains. For example,
the facts “Earth has an atmosphere” / “Mars does not have an atmosphere” would be in A
and ¬A*, respectively.
• Neutral analogy (O) - A set of propositions in the source such that the truth values of
analogous propositions in the target are not known, and vice versa.
• Hypothetical analogy (Q) - A single proposition Q known to hold in the source and a
hypothetical proposition Q* in the target whose truth value is not known but is the
conclusion of the analogical argument.
An argument from analogy might thus be a claim of the following form: “It is prima facie plausible
that Q* holds in the target because of certain known (or accepted) similarities with the source
domain, despite certain known (or accepted) differences” (Bartha, 2013, p. 202). Conformance to
this schema alone is insufficient to determine the quality of an analogical argument; Bartha’s
schema is meant to be entirely general, intended to represent both good and bad analogical
arguments. Bartha’s articulation model (Bartha, 2010) is based on the idea that a successful
analogical argument is one that identifies a prior association and a potential for generalization:
•

•

Prior Association. “There must be a clear connection, in the source domain, between the
known similarities (the positive analogy) and the further similarity that is projected to hold
in the target domain (the hypothetical analogy). This relationship determines which
features of the source are critical to the analogical inference.”
Potential for Generalization. “There must be reason to think that the same kind of
connection could obtain in the target domain. More pointedly: there must be no critical
disanalogy between the domains” (Bartha, 2019).

The articulation model describes how the prior association and potential for generalization can be
made explicit and assessed through a dialogue between an advocate and critic, whose goals are to
defend and attack the analogical argument, respectively. Because such a dialogue is meant to
reflect real-world dialogues which take place to assess analogical arguments, the standards for
what constitutes an acceptable prior association is dependent on the kind of vertical relations (i.e.,
the relations that hold between the elements in the source domain) being considered. Mathematical
analogies may require such relations to be proof-theoretic, whereas for certain informal arguments,
associations or weak causal relationships may suffice.
We take Bartha’s work as a starting point and assume that a good analogical argument has
a good prior association and potential for generalization.
2.2 Warrants
A warrant, in Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation, is a statement connecting the premises
and conclusion of an argument, showing how the former permits the inference of the latter
(Toulmin et al., 1984; Toulmin, 1958). Whereas premises may be facts, evidence, or pieces of data
that support a conclusion, a warrant is typically a broad principle of reasoning which might range
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from truth-preserving inference rules drawn from formal, deductive models, to unreliable heuristic
norms.
For example, given the premise, “Socrates is a man” and the conclusion, “Socrates is mortal,”
two possible warrants are W1: “Anyone who is a man is also mortal,” and W2: “Typically, men are
mortal.” These two warrants differ in the degree to which they allow the premise to support the
conclusion. They also differ in the ways they can be challenged: W1 can be refuted with a single
example of an immortal man; whereas W2 requires data showing that a majority of men are, in fact,
immortal. Given these differences in weak points, it behooves an arguer to ensure the strongest
possible warrant is used for their arguments.
The warrant, when made explicit, makes it easier to determine key features typically
associated with argument strength, not limited to: (1) what kind of attacks can be used against the
argument, (2) whether the premises are relevant or necessary to the argument, and (3) whether,
and with what strength, the conclusion follows from the premises. Furthermore, whether or not a
warrant was used in the creation of an argument, the process of making a warrant explicit and
evaluating its connection to the premises and conclusion is a highly useful exercise in the
assessment of that argument. Despite this level of utility, the warrant is often left implicit. This
difficulty has led researchers in AI and computational argumentation to omit warrants from their
models and datasets (Besnard et al., 2014; Habernal et al., 2014), and educators to leave warrants
out of their lesson plans (Harrell & Wetzel, 2015; Lunsford et al., 2002; Rex et al., 2010). It has
been observed that this omission is to the detriment of automated reasoning in the former case, and
to students in the latter (Beach et al., 2016; Warren, 2010;).
We consider analogical reasoning to be a form of substantive argumentation, analysis of
which renders of judgment of the plausibility of the comparison between domains. To elucidate
this distinction, Toulmin offers his analysis of an eighteenth-century story of the Count and the
Abbé. In the story, the Count tells his audience that he was the Abbé’s first penitent, and the Abbé
later claims that his first penitent was a murderer. Toulmin points out that treating this story as a
formal argument leads to misleading conclusions:
We have only to hear this story to jump to the conclusion: ‘The Count was a
murderer’; and truly, if we take the two statements at face value—'The Count was
the Abbé’s first penitent’ and “The Abbé’s first penitent was a murderer”—they
lead as they stand, by a formal argument, to the conclusion: ‘The Count was a
murderer.’ Yet the same story can be parsed, instead, as a piece of substantive
argumentation. What guarantee have we that either the Count or the Abbé is telling
the truth? (2001, p. 16)
Though formal argumentation suggests that the result that the Count is a murderer, in real
argumentation this result would need to be held in doubt due to the two different sources and
worries about their veracity. Despite its limitations, substantive argumentation is useful in
justifying adherence to a warrant. We will collectively refer to the kinds of reasoning processes
which create, improve, or otherwise evaluate arguments by focusing on their warrants and how
those warrants connect to the other parts of the arguments as “warrant-based reasoning.”
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Figure 1
Starting screen, as viewed by the advocate

3. The Warrant Game and WG-A
Given the benefits of warrant-based reasoning, our previous work developed a classroom activity
to introduce students of critical thinking to warrant-centered argumentation called “the Warrant
Game” (WG). In WG, teams of students put forth opposing arguments. They must carefully phrase
the warrants for their arguments, because warrants and their connections to the rest of the argument
can be attacked by other teams using one of a predefined set of allowed attacks. If an attack is
successful (as determined by a moderator), the attacking team gains points, whereas the attacked
team loses points and has the opportunity to revise the wording of their warrant to prevent (or
inadvertently open themselves up to) further attacks.
WG provides a model for how to create, and iteratively improve on, a warrant: First, create
an initial warrant by joining the premises and conclusion in a conditional statement (“If [premises],
then [conclusion]”). Second, determine whether the warrant is subject to any of the pre-determined
allowed attacks. If so, revise the warrant so it will be more resistant to these attacks, and then
iterate until the warrant is sufficiently strong (in WG, this tends to be limited by time
considerations or the skill level of the players). Thus, the measurement of argument strength used
here is qualitative: an argument is considered strong if its components are resistant to relevant
attacks. An argument’s maximal warrant strength is determined by the strongest warrant that can
be found for it, and the strength of that warrant in turn is determined by how resistant it is to the
attacks that can be found against it. This qualitative notion of argument strength allows us to define
a partial ordering between arguments: Given two arguments, if one is subject to a subset of the
attacks that another one is, then the first is stronger. Maximal warrant strength is meant to maintain
some compatibility with the approaches derived from argument acceptability semantics (Besnard
et al., 2014; Dung, 1995; Modgil & Prakken, 2013; Reed et al., 2017) and Walton’s argumentation
schemes (Walton, 1985; Walton et al., 2008).
The warrant game breaks down the task of warrant evaluation into simpler tasks,
represented by the allowed attack types. For example, instead of detecting the gap between
5

premises and conclusions (as in Boltužic and Šnajder (2016)), one allowed attack is to focus on
the much smaller gap between premises and a warrant’s antecedent. When explaining this attack
type to students, we might ask, “is it reasonable for you to believe the premises but not the
warrant’s antecedent?” Although drawing on an intuition of what it means for an inferential leap
to be “reasonable” is not yet fully achievable through AI, we suspect it might be approximable
through natural language inference tools; and for this reason, this approach to warrant evaluation
is in line with the long-term goals of our research program.
Figure 2
When deciding to attack, the critic is given a detailed image showing links in the argument which
are open to attack.

3.1 Warrant Game – Analogy (WG-A)
Our underlying approach to combining Bartha’s articulation model and WG is based on the
supposition that given an analogical argument a, the process of extracting a single warrant which
applies to both the source and target domains of a: (1) is a task which is accessible to many and
does not require excessive training and study, and (2) will tend to elicit reasoning and moves which
are relevant to the evaluation of a. The resulting model based on, and designed to test, this
supposition is called WG-A (Warrant Game for Analogies).
At the beginning of the game, an analogical argument is first presented in the form of source
facts (P ∪ A ∪ ¬B), a source hypothetical (Q), target facts (P* ∪ ¬A* ∪ B*), and a target hypothetical
(Q*). Players are told that Q is to be considered established fact, and the goal of the advocate is to
show that a supports Q*, whereas the critic’s goal is to show that a doesn’t support Q*. The
advocate begins by stating a candidate warrant which simultaneously explains the connection
between the source facts and source hypothetical, and between the target facts and target
hypothetical (Figure 1). A detailed example is available to the advocate at that point for further
clarification on what is expected.
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When the advocate completes their action, control reverts to the critic 1 who is given the
choice to either update the source / target facts, send an attack, or pass.2 When two passes are made
consecutively, the game is terminated. If a critic decides to attack, the five links which are possible
to attack are labeled as in Figure 2. Note that there are no attackable links between the source
domain’s facts and its conclusion, and likewise for the target domain. This is in keeping with the
guiding principles of warrant-based reasoning: attacks should be allowed only if they address a
flaw in the warrant or the ways in which it connects to other parts of the argument.
When the critic selects one of the attackable links, the two linked argument components are
displayed to the user, along with instructions for what constitutes a valid attack. These directions
treat the two linked argument components almost as if they were the antecedent and consequent
of a material inference. For example, consider the link summarized in Figure 3a. The critic is asked
to explain how the rule’s antecedent fails to lead to its consequent, and is given suggestions for
how to do so, e.g.: show that the “logical leap” between them is too far, or describe an example
where the antecedent holds but the consequent does not. In this case, the critic chose the latter, and
Figure 3b shows the screen that is subsequently shown to the advocate.
The advocate then has a choice of either rejecting or accepting the attack. If the attack is
rejected, a reason must be provided, and the advocate is encouraged to write a reason grounded in
the instructions the critic was given when creating this attack. An attack rejection effectively ends
that attack, but the critic can submit a similar attack later (indeed, they can do so directly after if
necessary). On the other hand, if the advocate decides to accept the attack, they are rewarded with
the opportunity to make another move. Though it is not required to, this additional move is meant
to be used to modify the rule or facts in order to defend against similar attacks in the future.
Only the advocate can make edits to the rule, and such edits are not subject to approval by
the critic. Modifications to the source or target facts, however, can be initiated by either the critic
or advocate.
See figures (3a, 3b) on following page (p. 7).

1
2

The move is recorded in a log that is always accessible to both participants.
Passing is only an option after a certain number of moves have been made.
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Figure 3a
The critic is provided an easy-to-read explanation of how to justify their attack and asked to
elaborate on the reasoning behind their attack.

Figure 3b: When attacked, the advocate is given a summary and asked whether or not the attack is
in accordance with the guidelines for that attack type.
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They can either add a new pair of facts (one to the source domain, one to the target domain) or edit
an existing pair of facts. It is explained to the user that such fact pairs must be analogous, and can
either both refer to positive analogous properties (e.g., “the chicken crosses the road” / “the boat
crosses the stream”) or opposite analogous properties (e.g., “the chicken lives near the road” / “the
boat is not housed near the stream”), as long as they are factual and consistent with the rest of the
fact pairs. To ensure this factuality and consistency, all suggested fact pair changes by one user
require approval by the other user. If the other user decides to accept a fact pair change, the player
who made the acceptance is rewarded with another turn. If not, they are required to explain why
they did not accept and are given the option of suggesting an alternate change instead, which is
passed back to the other player for approval or rejection. In the current version, this back-and-forth
is allowed to continue indefinitely, or until the user who initially suggested the change withdraws
the motion.
3.2 Comparing warrants and the prior association
With WG-A, we propose that by trying to find a common warrant that justifies both the source and
target hypotheticals, we perform many of the same functions achieved by Bartha’s articulation
model, namely: the extraction and clarification of a prior association, and the evaluation of its
potential for generalization. But it may be noted by the reader that this alignment is not perfect;
indeed, there are quite a few differences between Bartha’s prior association and what we are calling
the warrant of an analogical argument (which itself is a simplification of Toulmin’s warrants, e.g.
we do not explicitly represent the warrant’s backing).
Let us therefore briefly discuss some of the differences. Perhaps most importantly, the
warrant is inherently inferential and directional; it is meant to show how a particular inference is
warranted given a set of premises. A prior association, on the other hand, might go in the opposite
direction, it might be bi-directional, or an undirected relationship between P and Q. Bartha uses
these directions to distinguish between four types of prior associations (Bartha, 2010), most of
which we can approximately capture through warrants by changing their qualifiers: (1) Predictive
analogies (P → Q). The hypothetical Q is a consequence of P.3 (2) Explanatory analogies (P ←
Q). Q explains P.4 (3) Functional analogies (P ↔ Q). There is an association in each direction (but
not necessarily the same type).5 (4) Correlative analogies (P and Q have no known direction of
priority).6
The above list suggests that WG-A is best suited to non-functional, and perhaps nonexplanatory analogical arguments, since those better fit our formalization of the warrant. In our
initial tests of WG-A, we used starting fact pairs that had moral or ethical analogical arguments.
WG-A requires warrants to be expressed as “if-then” statements. To our knowledge, this is not
something that was required by Toulmin or others, but it is a useful way to informally express
many warrants, and as such is a helpful “starting point” for students still learning how to write
warrants.
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We can express this with the warrant “If PG, then QG,” where PG is a generalization of P and P∗, and QG is a
generalization of Q and Q∗. If the relationship is causal, we might use “If PG, then it will cause QG.”
4
We can approximately capture this with the warrant “If PG, then it can be explained by QG.”
5
Both directions can be expressed through warrants using the methods described above, but in many cases it is not
clear whether it is possible to express more than one direction at a time with a single warrant.
6
For example, we might have no more than knowledge of a statistical correlation between P and Q and express this
as “If PG, then it’s likely that QG.”
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Another important distinction is that Bartha’s articulation model first elaborates the prior
association in the source domain, and then assesses its potential for generalization by applying it
to the target. The warrants we propose here instead begin their lives as generalized statements, and
have that generalizability tested iteratively through attacks and rewrites simultaneously to source
and target domains.
3.3 Ensuring Relevance Without Assessing It Directly
WG-A is designed to ensure relevance in argumentative dialogues whose goals are to assess
analogical arguments. In this section, we sharpen our claims towards meeting that goal. First, we
adopt Bartha’s idea that a good analogical argument has a clear prior association and potential for
generalization. Then a relevant move (with respect to some analogical argument a) is a move which
affects the clarity of the prior association or its potential for generalization, either by affecting it
directly or by implying a direct effect (using some measure of inferential distance).7
Let us assume there is an argumentative dialogue D between minimally-trained participants,
whose goal is to assess the quality of some analogical argument a. If D is unrestricted and face-toface, it is extremely difficult to ensure participants only make utterances and actions that are
relevant to assessing a. And it is also extremely difficult for some moderator to assess relevance
of utterances in real-time. In American courts, for example, trial judges have “broad discretion
when ruling on the relevance of evidence” (Blinka, 2006). Yet, overconfidence in their own ability
to stay unbiased can lead to their ignoring of rules of evidence (Chortek, 2013), and there is
evidence to show that judges exposed to inadmissible biasing evidence were, unknowingly or not,
affected by it (Eren & Mocan, 2018; Landsman & Rakos, 1994; Rachlinski et al., 2015; Wistrich
et al., 2005). Furthermore, in adversarial trials, many objections of irrelevance “are simply missed
because opposing counsel did not recognize the issue within the time limits demanded by the rules”
(Blinka, 2006); other times, objections are used to “intimidate or confuse a lawyer of lesser skill,
knowledge, and experience” (ibid). As an attempt to combat such problems, WG-A operates
through an in-browser app, separating the players physically and only allowing them to make
moves through the game, giving them more time to carefully choose their next moves. No other
communication between players is allowed.
The rules of WG-A restrict the moves that are permitted, and this paper’s central claim is
that those allowed moves tend to be relevant to assessing a, since they tend to either strengthen the
prior association or potential for generalization, or point out their flaws. To support this claim, let
us first note that meaningful changes to the warrant correspond to meaningful changes to the prior
association or its potential for generalization. Consider a warrant of the form “If φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn then
γ1 ∧ ... ∧ γm,” where all φi, γj are open formulae. Then adding new conjuncts to the warrant’s
antecedent or removing conjuncts from the consequent will tend to reduce the space of
counterexamples to the warrant—i.e., the domain of objects for which the antecedent is true but
the consequent is false. Likewise, removing from the antecedent or adding to the consequent will
tend to increase the space of counterexamples. A change in the space of counterexamples to a
warrant is a change in the ways in which the warrant can be directly attacked on the basis of its
generality. Furthermore, any change in the antecedent may affect the degree to which it is
applicable to the source or target domain facts (and likewise for the consequent’s applicability to
the source or target hypothetical).
7

We are only dealing with the relevance of moves and are not addressing whether relevance is also a property of
general utterances or other in-person actions (e.g., using voice tones to make implicit suggestions, wearing a t-shirt
with printed text priming certain semantic frames, using body language to intimidate, etc.)
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As a WG-A game goes on, the set of conditions φi in the warrant’s antecedent will tend
towards describing factors which are relevant in the sense that they are necessary to describe the
prior association claimed to hold in both the source and target domains. If any conditions in the
antecedent are relevant but missing, then the space of possible counterexamples will be too large,
and the advocate will be motivated to narrow it through WG-A’s attack-edit mechanism. The
advocate is discouraged from adding conditions to the antecedent that they believe are irrelevant,
because it will unnecessarily cost them a turn. Our assumption is that this set of constraints will
push players to only make fact pair modifications if they affect the logical connection between the
fact pairs and the rule’s antecedent, or open up possibilities for attacks or warrant edits later.8
Only five attack types are allowed, all of which are encouraged to come in the form of
counterexamples. An attack on the link between the rule’s antecedent and consequent is thus a
challenge to its generalizability. Attacks on the links connecting the rule to the source facts (L.1
and L.4 in Figure 2) identify flaws in the rule’s applicability to the source domain, whereas
attacking links L.2 and L.5 do the same for the target domain. Our assumption here is that most
weaknesses in the prior association or its potential for generalization can be expressed in the form
of attacks through one of the five links we have identified.
3.3.1 Disallowed Moves
Thus, the three major types of allowed moves in WG-A (edits to the warrant, revision of the
source/target fact pairs, and attacks) all tend to affect the strength of the prior association or its
potential for generalization. However, we do not claim all possible moves relevant to assessing A
can be made using allowed moves of WG-A. Our approach to introducing moves to WG-A must
be a slow and careful one, else we risk allowing the irrelevant or deceptive argument tactics that
WG-A was designed to prevent. Our decisions on which move types or forms of dialogue to omit
were made by estimating the tradeoff between a move’s ability to introduce relevant moves and
its likelihood of allowing irrelevant moves and comments. All such decisions are subject to change
based on the results of future empirical evaluations. Notable features intentionally omitted from
the current version of WG-A include:
Limitations on editing. Both the advocate and critic have the option of editing the fact pairs
in the source and target, and such edits are subject to approval by both sides. However, neither has
the ability to make edits to the source or target hypotheticals Q. In very early versions of WG-A,
players would sometimes edit the hypotheticals to be uninformative, uninteresting, uncontroversial
statements. For example, the target hypothetical in Figure 1 might be changed to “Listening to
someone else’s phone call without their permission can be immoral in some situations.”
Indeed, in real-world dialogues, a participant might backtrack and weaken the scope of their
claim in order to make it more defensible. But the intended players of WG-A do not necessarily
deeply believe the truth or falsity of Q*. As such, the ability for the advocate to modify Q may
introduce too much of a temptation to make them easier to defend, and it is therefore disallowed
in the competitive version of WG-A (but in Section 4, we will introduce a case where enabling the
advocate to edit Q* is allowed, and perhaps even encouraged).
4. Developing an evidential hypothesis: Examples
8

If a player is being unnecessarily abusive, clearly not following the rules of the game, or behaving in a way that is
too far outside of what might be considered acceptable (in the opinion of the other player), the option to report their
actions is always available to both players. When a report is submitted, the game is paused until a human moderator
can review it and decide how to best resolve the dispute.
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We will now walk through an example of WG-A applied to the target task described in this paper’s
introduction. Our example uses two cases adapted from Klein (2013). In the source case, a driver
named Drake is in a car accident, and is hospitalized for several days, the first of which was spent
in an unconscious state. He wakes up, upon which his nurse (Nurse A) claims he said “I am in
unbearable pain.” A few days later, he dies from his injuries. The driver of the other car in the
accident is sued to compensate for the pain Drake suffered, and it is determined that the nurse’s
testimony is relevant. However, in our toy example, the evidential hypothesis for why Nurse A’s
testimony is relevant is not made explicit.
In the target case, Mrs. Shepard was admitted to the hospital, apparently in a coma. Several
days in, she woke up, and according to the nurse (Nurse B), said “my husband has poisoned me.”
She died not long after, and her husband was charged with murder. Is the testimony of Nurse B
relevant to the case in the same way that the testimony of Nurse A was relevant to the previous
case, and if so, what is an evidential hypothesis justifying this determination?
We structure the initial state of WG-A using the facts and hypotheticals listed in Figure 4.
An initial, simplistic warrant is provided: “If a witness recalls the defendant waking up from an
unconscious state and saying X, then X is likely to be true.” An immediate attack on the warrant
(attack point L.3) seems an obvious next step. A counterexample to the warrant would suffice: “A
witness might simply be lying about what the defendant said.”
Such an attack can easily be responded to by the advocate, by updating the warrant to “If
a highly credible witness recalls the defendant waking up from an unconscious state and saying
X, then X is likely to be true.” However, this leaves attack points L.1 and L.2 open, as the critic
might claim that the nurses haven’t been established as “highly credible.” This again is easy to fix,
by proposing that facts be updated on both sides to include “The nurse is a medical professional,
and thus highly credible.”
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Figure 4
Starting State and Initial Warrant for Example 1

Such a claim is disputable by the critic, but for simplicity let us assume they accept these
proposed fact changes. Another attack can now be launched on the warrant: “Defendants waking
up from unconscious states are often confused, and they have been known to have distorted
perceptions.” Examples of patients waking from comas and exhibiting paranoid behavior about
their surroundings might be cited. In any case, the advocate is forced to respond with a
strengthening of the warrant, and the result may be: “If a highly credible witness recalls the
defendant waking up from an unconscious state and stating their state of mind is X, then it is
likely their state of mind is actually X.” This warrant shift specifies that the testimony of the
witness is relevant only insofar as it helps to establish the state of mind of the defendant, to which
presumably, the defendant has privileged access.
However, this shift in meaning of the warrant opens the warrant’s connections to the source
and target to attack. Specifically, the warrant’s consequent now speaks of the defendant’s “state of
mind,” and although the source conclusion (Drake’s feeling of unbearable pain) can be classified
as such, Mrs. Shepard’s memory cannot. Instead, the target warrant’s consequent must be edited,
e.g. to “It’s likely that Mrs. Shepard believed her husband poisoned her.” Now, the argument on
the target side is not that the witness’s testimony is relevant to (directly) establishing whether her
husband poisoned her, but rather to whether she recalls her husband doing so. As noted earlier,
the direct editing of conclusions was not allowed in earlier versions of WG-A, out of concern that
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advocates would make the conclusion trivial and thus easier to defend. That concern, however,
does not apply in the present example, since a trivial conclusion would be of little use to the
advocate.
Figure 5
Final State for Example 1

The resulting state of our example WG-A game is pictured in Figure 5. Players WG-A can
theoretically continue after this, making attacks and edits ad infinitum, but this is a natural stopping
point, particularly because the very distinction just discussed was the one Klein (2013) sought to
make in contrasting these two example cases. If the conclusion of the target case is shifted to the
one in Figure 5, Klein argues, “[t]his is precisely the kind of evidence the state of mind exception
[to the hearsay rule] is designed to allow in.”
Also note that Figure 5 still contains a fact pair (relating to the witness’s statements being
out-of-court) that is not made use of in the warrant. Implicitly, then, that fact pair has been
determined to be irrelevant to the present case, at least according to the warrant-centric definition
of relevance we adopt here. Many other fact pairs may be present but un-used in an instance of
WG-A (e.g., the gender of the nurse, or the amount of time Drake and Mrs. Shepard were
unconscious). It is thus that WG-A approaches determination of which factors are relevant to a
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warrant: not by requiring direct assessment of their relevance, but by putting their relevance to the
test, and determining relevance based on the final product of the WG-A game.
5. Conclusion
WG-A is a recent contribution to a long line of highly structured argumentation games, which
break down complex and sometimes opaque reasoning processes into easier-to-understand,
algorithmic steps. This may lead to better artificially intelligent reasoners, if performing well at
those simpler steps become within reach of AI. They may also lead to AI that is better at justifying
and explaining its reasoning, particularly if we require them to break down their reasoning in
similar ways.
The educational implications of the above are clear as well. Experienced reasoners may
look at some of the visualizations and moves in WG-A as obvious and trivial, but those who are
new to legal or argumentative reasoning can benefit from seeing WG-A's possible points of attack
clearly presented. Such breakdowns can also make it easier to design automated tutoring systems
to help students by giving suggestions of applicable attacks and responses to those attacks.
In recent work [NOTE: this is currently under publication consideration, and will be
updated in this paper’s final version], our lab explored whether minimally trained participants
using WG-A performed better on a task of argumentation and critical reasoning than participants
who were simply asked to discuss an analogy in an open-ended dialogue format. Our initial results
suggest that a benefit does in fact exist, and interestingly, this effect may be delayed: the
participants who used WG-A did not perform much better at the critical reasoning tests
immediately after using WG-A, but did perform better a week later than the control group. Future
work will further explore this and related ideas.
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